INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORT OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENT
For the past seven years –almost half of its lifetime –ADC has employed nuclear armament. Use of MB-l and GAR-II air-to-air weapons and BOMARC IM-99A/B ground-to-air missiles has multiplied by many times the command’s capability for stopping enemy bomber attacks. Along with the advantages brought by these weapon, however, came formidable disadvantages.
The presence of atomic weapons, in effect, placed ADC’ under a sword of Damocles: one false step might lead to an accidental detonation, and an exploded nuclear weapon at a tactical base might virtually wipe out the unit involved. If a 20 kiloton atomic charge could level the good part of a city (as ‘one did at Hiroshima in 1945), it scarcely overtaxed the imagination to visualize what damage would ensue if one of ADC’s MB-was inadvertently detonated to full power. But more than the safety of each atomic-capable tactical unit was at stake. In addition to blasting a squadron sky-high, toxic residual radiation could be scattered for miles from the scene of detonation and cause plutonium poisoning. NATO nations storing U.S. nuclear weapons abroad might be tempted to revoke permission for their further storage, while at home, the adverse publicity resulting from such an explosion, and consequent Congressional action, could prevent within a short time further use of nuclear armament which had taken ADC years to plan for, develop, finance, and implement. Worse for the national defense ADC’s ability to strike down attacking enemy bombers would be cut to a fraction of its existing capability. But worst of all, the possibility, though remote, that an “accidental war” might be started was not to be ruled out. The magnitude of the problem of handling and using nuclear weapons safely and efficiently, therefore, was staggering. […]
Air Force Base Fighter Interceptor Squadron Superfund site BRAC Closure Andrews AFB, MD 95 FIS Y Bunker Hill AFB, IN 319 FIS Castle AFB, CA 456 FIS Y 1991 Charleston AFB, SC 444 FIS Davis-Monthan, AZ 15 FIS Dover AFB, DE 98 FIS Y Dow AFB, ME 75 FIS Duluth AFB, MI 11 FIS (343 Ftr Gp George AFB, CA 329 FIS Y 1988 Glasgow AFB, MT 13 FIS Grand Forks AFB, ND 18 FIS (478 Ftr Wg proposed Griffiss AFB, NY 49 FIS Y 1993 Hamilton AFB, CA 83 & 84 FIS (78 Ft· Wg) K. I. Sawyer AFB, MI 62 FIS (56 Ftr Wg) 1993 Kincheloe AFB, MI 438 FIS (507 Ftr Wg) Kingsley AFB, OR 322 FIS (408 Ftr Gp) Langley AFB, VA 48 FIS Lockbourne AFB, OH 87 FIS Loring AFB, ME 27 FIS Y 1991 Malmstrom AFB, MO 29 FIS McChord AFB, WA 318 FIS (325 Ftr Wg Y McGuire AFB, NJ 539 FIS Y Minot AFB, ND 5 FIS Otis AFB, MA 60 FIS proposed Oxnard AFB, CA 437 FIS (414 Ftr Gp) Paine AFB, WA 64 FIS (57 Ftr Gp) Richards-Gebaur AFB, MO 326 FIS (328 Ftr Wg) 1991 Selfridge AFB, MI 71 & 94 FIS (1st FTR Wg) Seymour-Johnson AFB, NC 482 FIS Spokane AFB, WA (84 Ftr Gp) Suffolk AFB, NY 2 FIS (52 Ftr Gp) Travis AFB, CA 82 FIS Y Webb AFB, TX 33 FIS Westover AFB MA 76 FIS Wurtsmith AFB, MI 445 FIS proposed 1991 The FIS information was extracted from the ADC report “Nuclear Armament and Manned Interceptors, 1951-1963.”
The Superfund and BRAC information was added to track the status of the bases.
Paper No 20 Nuclear Armament and Manned Interceptors, 1951-1963 Partial Release.pdf
Early Nuclear Weapons Contaminants of Concern
1. General. Early nuclear weapons used polonium-beryllium (Po-Be) initiators to generate neutrons during the explosion sequence. Due to the 138-day half-life of 210Po, these devices had to be replaced periodically; however, due to the short half-life, residuals would not be present today. During initiator replacement operations, fissile materials in the capsule were disassembled, inspected, and cleaned prior to reassembly with a new initiator. Plutonium components were encapsulated in a metal skin that limited the potential for loose radioactive material hazards to workers. However, due to the significantly lower radiotoxicity, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and DU parts were not encapsulated in inert metals and were subject to oxidation. While oxidized uranium parts were cleaned on tables prepared with butcher paper to contain oxidized uranium contamination, some potential existed for the spread of contamination to facility. Floors would have had the greatest potential for contamination, if the material was a residual contaminant. Between 1954 and 1957, Po-Be initiators were phased out of the stockpile, effectively limiting maintenance of capsules to an annual activity.
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Weapons Storage Area Survey of 400 Series Buildings at Medina Annex [Lackland AFB], San Antonio, Texas
2013-07-xx News – Radioactive Waste Biggs AFB, TX
Biggs Airfield/Fort Bliss, TX – In 1966, the Air Force transferred a contaminated WSA and radioactive waste burial site to the Army but did not warn them of potential radiation risk. The radioactive contamination at the site is from the maintenance of nuclear weapons from the 1950s and 1960s. The specific quantity of maintenance waste buried is not known due to incomplete records. According to the Air Force, it disposed of the radioactive waste in accordance with the Atomic Energy Commission and Air Force procedures at the time.
[Read More…]
RW017
RW017 was a radioactive burial site used exclusively by the Sandia National Labs personnel at the base, who conducted inspections and modified the weapons as necessary. Records from the AEC departure and interview subjects suggest that the AEC also exhumed this site and relocated the material to Pantex. However, no records exist that would verify this anecdotal evidence. Indeed, due to the discovery of weapons components at this site in 2004, the likelihood that the site was either partially exhumed or not all is high. The components found were reviewed by special weapons experts and were verified as the correct type for weapons of that era. Furthermore, former Sandian Harold Rarrick confirmed that those types of devices were disposed of in similar sites at other AEC weapons storage areas. The typical methodology for Sandia/AEC was to place radiological materials into cardboard boxes and bury the boxes at the site. Materials that may be present at this site include Polonium (not likely due to its 138-day half-life), Beryllium, Cesium, and Uranium [highly enriched uranium (HEU), depleted uranium (DU), natural Uranium (Unat)], and Trichloroethylene (TCE).
Approximately ¼ to ½ mile to the Southeast of RW033 is OT-012. This site was used to demilitarize high explosive components from the special weapons demilitarized at Lackland. There are reports that during some of the operations, explosions occurred when materials were stacked too high, causing the materials to detonate rather than deflagrate. Some of this material may have been ejected as far as RW033. There are some indications that radiological materials such as plutonium or uranium may have been part of this burn.
“[Denise] Caron [the George AFB Base Environmental Coordinator (BEC)] also asserted as recently as Dec. 10 of last year, “We didn’t have a nuclear mission at George. We didn’t use nukes. We didn’t use tactical nukes.”
Six days later, Valley Wide Newspapers, published a photograph reportedly taken on Apr. 11, 1961 of four members of an ordinance leading crew with the 329th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron then stationed at George as they affixed a Douglas MB-1 Genie nuclear air-to-air missile to the undercarriage of an F-105 interceptor.
Caron also insisted last December that an Office of Special Investigations (0.S.I.) investigation carried out in 1989 and 1990 ascertained that no weapons-grade nuclear materials had ever been disposed of at the base.
Shortly thereafter, xxx, the now-retired O.S.I. investigator who headed up that investigation, came forward to state that his investigation had not concerned itself with the presence of weapons-grade materials at the base. Instead, he said it had merely been undertaken to establish that some low-level nuclear materials, such as medical wastes, components of x-ray units and cathode-ray tubes, had been buried in the base’s southwest disposal area.
Over the last two years, a number of former airmen stationed at the base, including a master sergeant and staff sergeant, have provided Valley Wide Newspapers with statements indicating that nuclear weapons were present on the base in the 1960s and 1970s and that some radioactive materials had been buried in the southeast disposal area as well as on the base grounds behind the alert hangar. The southeast disposal area is less than three-quarters of a mile upstream from, residential, agricultural, and commercial supply wells for Adelanto, Oro Grande and George Air Force Base.”
1994-07-01 GAFB Airman [Frank Vera] Exposed to Radiation
1994-08-24 GAO – Better Data Needed For Radioactively Contaminated Defense Sites
On December 22, 1992, Senator John Glenn requested that the General Accounting Office (GAO) investigate whether the Department of Defense (DOD) has accounted for all of its radiologically contaminated sites. The GOA found that the DOD could NOT identify the location, isotopes, or amount of radioactive material disposed of at its bases. 1994-08-24 GAO – Better Data Needed For Radioactively Contaminated Defense Sites (PDF, [Read More…]
2003-05-08 AF – Buried Radioactive Weapons Maintenance Waste
Air Force acknowledged that it routinely withheld information and records about radioactive waste from Federal, State and Local regulators, contractors, and the public. [Read More…]
AFI40-201 13 APRIL 2007
91(a) Material—Radioactive material exempted from NRC licensing controls under Section 91(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, in the interest of national defense. These include materials associated with nuclear weapons.
91(b) Material—Radioactive material exempted from NRC licensing controls under Section 91(b) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, in the interest of national defense. These include materials in nuclear weapons
Radioactive Waste—Waste that contains radioactive material. Radioactive waste can be generally classed in one of four categories:
- High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW)—HLRW is spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants and waste material from reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.
- Transuranic Waste—Waste material that contains transuranic elements with half-lives greater than 20 years and concentrations greater than 100 nanoCuries per gram. A transuranic is an element with an atomic number greater than 92 (e.g. plutonium, americium, curium).
- Low-level Radioactive Waste (LLRW)—LLRW is any radioactive waste that is not HLRW, uranium tailings, or transuranic waste.
- Mixed Waste—Waste that contains hazardous waste and source, special nuclear, or byproduct material subject to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (i.e., material regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
AFI91-108 12 FEBRUARY 2015
Terms
91(a) Material—Radioactive material exempted from NRC licensing controls under Section 91(a) of the AEC of 1954, as amended, in the interest of national defense, under the possession of the DOE.
91(b) Material—Radioactive material exempted from NRC licensing controls under Section 91(b) of the AEC of 1954, as amended, in the interest of national defense, under the possession of the DOD. These include materials in nuclear weapons.
91(b) Permit—Written authorization from the Air Force Safety Center for Air Force organizations to receive, possess, use, store, transport, transfer and dispose of some radioactive materials defined under Section 91(b) of the AEC of 1954. Permits are similar, in function, to USAF Radioactive Materials Permits issued by the USAF Radioisotope Committee, as defined under AFI 40-201.
Low—Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW)—LLRW is any radioactive waste that is not high-level radioactive waste, uranium tailings, or transuranic waste.
Legacy RAM Sites—Sites contaminated from historical nuclear weapons maintenance, accidents, or reactor residuals. This covers maintenance on unsealed weapons and accidents that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s.
Mixed Waste—Waste that contains hazardous waste and source, special nuclear, or byproduct material subject to the AEC of 1954 (i.e., material regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
Radioactive Material—Materials with unstable nuclei decay by the nuclear transformation. Transformations can emit ionizing radiations: alpha or beta particles, gamma radiation or radiation and/or neutrons.
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